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ABSTRACT 
The Influence of Threatened State Preemption on City Council 
Voting Behavior and Municipal Broadband 
by 
Dillon P. Corbridge, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2017 
Major Professor: Dr. Damon Cann 
Department: Political Science 
 Since the progressive era, American cities have generally expanded their 
authority in policymaking and service provision. State governments have at times 
acted to preempt city authority on particular points of policy, but it is unclear 
whether the threat of this action inspires caution in the decision making of city 
leaders. The results of an experimental survey distributed to elected city officials 
across the United States show that a perceived threat of preemption does not 
significantly discourage city leaders in supporting a proposed broadband internet 
service provision. These results suggest that political pressure in the form of 
preemption is not persuasive to city leaders, and that local representational 
interests are likely more influential on municipal government. 
(62  pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
The Influence of Threatened State Preemption on City Council 
Voting Behavior and Municipal Broadband 
Dillon P. Corbridge 
 The relationship between city and state government has been contentious 
at times throughout American history. Cities only have the legal authority granted 
to them by state government, yet many cities have cause to seek policy that may 
not be in the interest of those who govern the state. Leaders of American states 
may choose to preempt municipal authority by removing the legal power of a city 
to perform certain actions. While preemption provides states with a tool for 
regulating the policies and practices that cities may pursue, it is unclear whether 
city leaders act cautiously to avoid preemption, or instead only pursue different 
policy goals once preemption removes more preferred options. This thesis 
examines this question through an experimental research design where, under 
varying degrees of threatened preemption, elected municipal officials were asked 
about their potential support for a new broadband internet service provision. The 
results of this research suggest that perceived threats of preemption do not have a 
significant effect on the policy choices of city leaders, and that preemption 
remains a blunt instrument for states in directing municipal policy outcomes. 
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Introduction—City/State Conflict and Local Decision-making 
In the United States, the power dynamics of a federalist system have been 
well studied and scrutinized. The conflicts between state and national government 
have animated political debate for centuries and has helped to guide some of the 
rhetoric that surrounds discussion of the United States Civil War to this day. Less 
understood, however, is the more local sort of federalist conflict and tension that 
exists in the United States between states and their constituent cities. This conflict 
was especially apparent in North Carolina in the months following the passing of 
House Bill 2 in March of 2016. The bill gained notoriety for its requirement that 
people using bathrooms in state facilities must use the bathroom that corresponds 
with the sex listed on their birth certificates. However, the political origins and 
wider reach of this bill received less attention. In addition to its regulation of state 
restroom facilities, House Bill 2 superseded and preempted “any ordinance, 
regulation, resolution, or policy adopted or imposed by a unit of local government” 
relating to wages, hours, or benefits, and prevented the filing of discrimination 
lawsuits in state court (House Bill 2 2016).  
With the passage of this bill, the state of North Carolina effectively stripped 
city governments within the state of the ability to pass particular forms of anti-
discrimination legislation, as well as minimum wage provisions. For the city of 
Charlotte, these restrictions had direct policy and legal consequences, as the city 
had itself voted to add gay and transgender people to the list of classes protected 
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against discrimination in public spaces (Delia 2016). The following controversy 
would bring significant national attention as well as negative economic 
consequences.  
While these details have been well-reported throughout North Carolina and 
the rest of the United States, a question remains—If city leaders in Charlotte could 
see the future and know that the state would nullify their actions, would they still 
pass the same legislation and set off a chain of events that would invite national 
scrutiny, legal battles, and boycotts? Generally, does the threat of state action alter 
the decisions that city leaders are likely to make, or do the local electoral 
incentives in front of city leaders override concerns about state intervention? It 
may be that some of these conflicts are driven by ideology, emotion, and outside 
interests, as appears to have been the case in North Carolina. The fundamental 
conflict between the policy interests of cities and states, along with the decision-
making process for city leaders that accompanies such conflict, remain important, 
and under-researched. This thesis addresses this sort of conflict by directly posing 
a potential service proposal to city officers and gauging their voting responses 
while under varying degrees of threat of state intervention and preemption, and 
finds that voting behavior of city leaders is resistant to such threats. 
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City-Provided Internet Access as a Question Mechanism 
The nature of political ideology and competing voter interests can make 
this question difficult to examine directly, as omitted ideological and voter 
variables can present great difficulties for research. It is entirely possible that if a 
study about state preemption and municipal voting behaviors asked questions 
about the wrong subject—such as the rights of transgender people and 
bathrooms—the researcher would merely find out how respondents felt about 
LGBT issues, rather than if a threat of state preemption had an effect on the 
municipal leader’s vote. In order to more directly gauge the impact of threatened 
preemption on municipal voting, I have asked city leaders about their potential 
votes on a proposal for municipally provided broadband service. Although any 
service proposal or expenditure involves ideological conflict, a service proposal will 
be less emotional and less politically explosive than certain other forms of 
controversial legislation, and city leaders will likely be more open to both 
persuasion and a variety of local pressures. Rather than being a local manifestation 
of a hotly contested national issue, a service proposal is a local manifestation of 
local issues. Here New York’s Mayor LaGuardia’s famous statement that, "There is 
no Republican or Democratic way to pick up the garbage" provides insight 
(Andersson and Moroni 2014, 93). Internet access does not hold the importance of 
waste disposal, but it is potential service where the details of local politics can 
cross political lines, and be shaped by budgetary, legal, and electoral incentives.  
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The subject of municipal broadband provides an interesting framework for 
examining city responsiveness in the United States, as well as preemption, home 
rule, and public goods provision. As high-speed internet access has become 
increasingly ubiquitous, reliance on this service has increased as well. Access to 
broadband internet is becoming increasingly important to households throughout 
the United States, but that access has come in different forms in different places, 
and this service has not always been extended to all areas equally. According to a 
2015 White House report, there still exists a connectivity gap in many 
communities, where some are able to obtain high-quality internet access and 
others are not. In other communities, a single telecommunications company may 
dominate a market, facing little, if any competition (Executive Office of the 
President, 2015, 10). Although public service commissions have regulatory power 
over these issues, a city’s preferences may not fully align with the commission’s 
actions or the state of the market. In this environment, some municipalities have 
elected to establish a network themselves and act as an internet service provider 
(ISP) within their jurisdiction,, either competing with or supplanting local 
monopolies. Theories of electoral politics may lead us to believe that this decision 
is an active response to the desires of the local voting public in these communities, 
but such decisions have at times been controversial at the state level, with 21 states 
having established some type of restriction on this form of municipal activity. At 
this time, there are about 160 municipalities in the United States that offer some 
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form of broadband service to the majority of their residents, while another 185 
communities maintain some publicly-owned fiber service available to potions of 
the community (Institute for Local Self-Reliance 2015). 
The subject of municipal broadband represents an ongoing arena for 
conflict between cities and states, where cities may choose to establish new 
services, and states may wish to curtail such actions. It also represents a good 
potential test subject for city and state conflict, as it avoids the explosive and 
problematic conflicts that some other policy arenas face. While there will be 
conflict on this issue, it is reasonable to suppose that a competition of influences 
may alter the considered voting decisions of some city council members.  
To examine this competition of influences, I used an experimental survey, 
sampling city leaders throughout the United States. The treatments within the 
experiment relied on descriptive vignettes, which provided city leaders with a 
hypothetical new service proposal, and asked whether they supported or opposed 
the proposition. Preemption targeted towards flawed or unpopular policy would 
simply give city leaders one extra reason among many to oppose a proposal. Thus, 
in order to isolate whether a threat of state preemption reduces the likelihood of 
affirming votes, the proposal described in these vignettes for this project was 
intentionally designed to be benign, if not appealing. The results of this project 
demonstrate that in the case of a perceived threat of preemption, city leaders are 
resistant to coercive influence from state legislatures. 
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Literature on City Responsiveness and Public Service Provision 
This project is rooted in the broader political science literature on the 
responsiveness of elected officials and municipal politics. There are strong 
theoretical arguments and reasonable evidence to support the claim that cities are 
responsive to the political and economic sentiments of their residents, and that 
city policy and spending reflect these sentiments. The broader context of public 
services research provides a backdrop for this issue, by illustrating the processes of 
why and how local governments are responsive to their residents. Charles Tiebout, 
who proposed a “pure theory of public expenditures”, wrote the most important 
theoretical work regarding municipal services (Tiebout 1956). In Tiebout’s 
theoretical model, citizens will sort themselves according to their service 
preferences, by moving to areas that most closely allocate the balance of taxes and 
provided services to the residents’ individual predilections. Tiebout’s work is a 
pure theory rather than an applied model. Thus it describes an equilibrium state; 
with citizens choosing from a large number of communities and enjoying full 
mobility, knowledge, and no employment restrictions, they will perfectly sort 
themselves along preferences of relative service provision and tax burdens. This 
phenomenon of individuals and households voting with their feet, termed as “exit” 
by Albert O. Hirschman (1970), is the primary lens through which Tiebout’s theory 
has been examined (Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994). Hirschman’s work also gives 
attention to the process by which internal protest, referred to as “voice,” may also 
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come to influence firms, organizations and states. Both of these processes are 
critical for how municipalities come to reflect the will of their constituents over 
time or consequently shrink, and will be further examined.  
Tiebout and Hirschman’s work are seminal to the literature on both local 
public expenditures and responsiveness, and many applied models have been 
created to test the basic premise of Tiebout’s theory that citizens vote with their 
feet. Dowding, John, and Biggs (1994, 768) provide a helpful survey of much of the 
empirical literature on the subject, stating that empirical tests of Tiebout’s work 
“are legion and multifarious.” Because that work is varied and at times 
contradictory, I will give a brief overview of some of the most commonly cited 
work in this area.  
Bickers, Salucci, and Stein (2006) find that residents’ feelings regarding 
“core municipal services” are among the strongest determinants of whether people 
will move. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) find that positive changes in the local levels 
of air pollution, which they describe as exogenous improvements in public goods, 
will result in increased population density. Stated more directly, people will vote 
with their feet and move to better access better public goods such as clean air, just 
as Tiebout predicts. The prevalence of this action is likely increasing over time, as 
the cost of moving has decreased significantly over the past century. Rhode and 
Strumpf (2003) find that the impact of the exit phenomenon has become more 
pronounced over the past 150 years due to lowered moving costs, but they also 
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argue that publicly provided goods demands are not necessarily obvious or the 
first priority for movers. Devereux and Weisbrod (2006) also find that dissatisfied 
residents are more likely to either move or complain, and that these alternatives 
will result in political response. From a normative perspective, it seems both 
intuitive and positive that communities will eventually mold their constituents. 
The empirical evidence for these claims shows that electoral incentives are at work 
in cities, and these incentives may at times run counter to the ideological values of 
certain representatives. 
 While there is much support for Tiebout’s theory in the literature, there is 
also significant criticism. Boadway and Tremblay (2012) find that while it may still 
have relevance in the most local of issues, it is not helpful in studying state-level 
fiscal policy. Truman Bewley (1981) argues that Tiebout’s model is suited to narrow 
cases and is thus not satisfying as a general theory of local public goods. In certain 
applications, restrictions based on the housing market may also be shown to be 
more important to citizen choice than public services. In this instance, exit alone 
does not provide a compelling story for why municipal institutions offer particular 
services (Kelleher and Lowery 2002).  
The structure of the community may matter as well. Lowery (2000) argues 
that the process of consolidating municipalities into a larger whole may be 
beneficial to both local interests and the offering of higher quality public services. 
The research of Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog (1992, 15-16) finds further evidence of 
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this. The implications of citizen sorting as an aspect of the Tiebout model become 
less clear, however, in a consolidated government setting, and thus it is difficult to 
come to full conclusions about the virtue of consolidated government in public 
service provision (Lyons, Lowery and Dehoog 1992). Schneider (1986) argues that 
fragmented municipal governments are inherently associated with a degree of 
competition that will result in smaller budgets. Rather than focusing on public 
services, Schneider (1989) in a later article focuses on the local tax levels and 
argues that local government may vie for citizen attention by exacting a lower tax 
burden on their residents.  
In addition to these concerns, cities may be quite limited in their capability 
to pursue these issues, due to limited statutory authority, limited capacity, and 
limited finances. Statutory authority is of particular interest here. State 
preemption of city authority is a current and often controversial issue, as already 
discussed with reference to North Carolina and the city of Charlotte. Preemption 
has received a great deal of attention from law reviews, but academic treatments 
are much less common. Instead, academic literature more frequently focuses on 
the general principle of home rule. In general terms, cities possess the power that 
they are given by the state legislature. However, this is not a simple, conclusive, or 
carved-in-stone rule.  Municipal independence, or home rule, is a legal principle 
that exists to varying degrees throughout the United States. Because of this, cities 
in many states have differing degrees of independence and statutory authority. 
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Although most states have some degree of home rule, it is typically in the form of 
structural or functional home rule, rather than a broader, sweeping sort of rule 
that necessarily includes all functions and fiscal powers (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 
2001, 1-4, 476-477). While cities are often limited in their statutory power, this 
limitation does not provide a clear obstacle to the establishment of municipal 
communication networks, as many of these networks exist in states with very 
limited municipal independence.1  
City leaders are generally responsive to the political desires of their 
constituents (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014). This responsiveness aligns with 
partisan electoral outcomes as well (Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016; 
Einstein and Kogan 2015). This responsiveness may be resistant to outside 
influences, making it difficult for any non-constituent group to influence local 
outcomes. Preemption may also introduce dynamics that alter political 
responsiveness in elected officials at the municipal level. Certain issues and 
positions may be positively viewed by particular communities, but failure to enact 
or create such policy or goods may also fail to inspire any sort of impassioned 
response, either in terms of votes or in terms of decisions to move. Although there 
may be positive consequences for pursuing some policies, it does not necessarily 
                                                     
1 These networks exist in Dillon’s Rule states such as Alabama, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Iowa. 
In these states city authority is limited solely to the powers granted by the legislature. It appears 
that the establishment of a communication network is an assumed power related to the provision 
of basic services, as this power is not explicitly granted in obvious terms (Institute for Local Self-
Reliance 2015; Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001, 4, 476-477). 
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follow in all circumstances that a failure to pursue such policy will have negative 
repercussions of significance for elected officials. Preemption could limit how 
responsive municipal leaders may be to their residents, and enforce policy 
homogeneity in various cities across a state. In pursuing their own reelections and 
their resident’s desired policy outcomes, city leaders may want to avoid a situation 
that leads to preemption even if that decision comes at the cost of pursuing 
responsive policy, unless they believe that resisting outside influence will be more 
appreciated than saving resources will be.  
Home internet access as a public service should also be addressed. 
Although rural access has improved dramatically, the disparity between urban and 
rural internet users persists (US Department of Commerce 2016). Although the 
merits of the argument for publicly owned broadband may need to be tested, and 
are beyond the scope of this project, this issue has received some scholarly 
attention. Jain, Mandviwalla, and Banker (2007) argue that private 
telecommunication firms have in the past generally underserved rural and 
impoverished areas, and suggest that municipal government may act as a catalyst 
for technological development within its geographic area. Gillett, Lehr, and Osorio 
(2004) give a detailed taxonomy of local government broadband initiatives, 
discussing the varying roles of municipalities in broadband provision. Their 
findings fit the assumption that municipalities may be filling gaps left by private 
market providers, and they present evidence that municipal electric utilities are 
ͱͲ 
 
more likely to provide communication infrastructure when private-market cable 
and DSL options are limited.2 This assertion also fits the assumption that public 
internet services would be desired by the residents of the community in these 
communities, as there would be fewer useful private-market alternatives.  
  
                                                     
2 These assumptions of broadband access are based on the FCC’s January 2015 revision of the 
definition of broadband to minimum download and upload speeds of 25 Mbps and 3 Mbps 
respectively. Under prior definitions of broadband access, rural communities have better access to 
broadband, though it is still generally weak compared to what is available in urban and suburban 
centers. 
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Incentives and Inhibitions for New Public Services 
 As noted above, there is a large body of scholarly literature that argues that 
cities are politically responsive to their residents and that public opinion and 
elections have a meaningful impact on policy and spending in municipal 
government (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2015; 
Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016). However, mitigating factors to this 
phenomenon are less well researched. This raises the question of what scenarios 
may lead city leaders to abandon proposals that they would otherwise pursue in 
order to satisfy local voters and ensure city growth. While certain practical 
concerns such as budgetary problems or limited technical capacity provide simple 
and intuitive explanations for why some proposals may be abandoned, these 
explanations are often unique to a particular situation or location, and do not 
provide a consistent political reason for cities to avoid popular policy. In contrast, 
the threat of preemption from the state government may inspire city leaders to 
abandon potential policy pursuits, as preemption may make such pursuits a waste 
of time and money, with new projects potentially being either crippled financially 
or prohibited altogether. Furthermore, preemption limits the policy outcomes that 
might align with voter preferences. The relationship dynamics at play in this form 
of intrastate federalism are worthy of consideration. 
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 As of 2014, 21 states had passed legislation that restricts or regulates 
municipal offerings of communication services to varying degrees. Legislation in 
some states, including Colorado, South Carolina, and Texas, effectively prohibits 
municipal broadband offerings. Other states, such as Minnesota, Tennessee, and 
Washington, allow the creation of municipal networks under certain local 
conditions. This legislation often comes with meaningful restrictions, often 
relating to city size, the presence of private offerings, and the nature of local utility 
districts (Baller 2014).  
 The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has proposed model 
legislation that addresses this issue. Portions of this legislation prohibit 
municipalities from creating publicly held communications services, such as ISPs 
(American Legislative Exchange Council 2012). Garrett and Jansa (2015) provide an 
interesting argument that interest group model legislation such as this is an 
important component of policy diffusion from state to state, and that such 
legislation has an important impact on the substance of legislation and the relative 
ease of passing that legislation.3 The piece of model legislation cited here is framed 
as providing protection for private industry from unfair public competition. 
According to a January 2015 White House report, however, in most communities 
                                                     
3 The article from Garrett and Jansa actually uses model legislation from ALEC as a significant part 
of its methodology. 
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there is little competition in the marketplace for wired internet to begin with.4 If 
there truly is a dearth of competition, it may not be entirely accurate to term the 
creation of a new offering as a threat to the integrity of the marketplace, and it is 
plausible that city leaders will act to create a public ISP in response to local 
demands and political desires. However, any number of local or legal pressures 
could operate to diminish the level of responsiveness to this particular problem. 
The literature around public responsiveness indicates that cities will be responsive 
to local pressures. However, it is also clear in the literature that this responsiveness 
is not necessarily straightforward or consistent, and local preferences may vary 
significantly from community to community as well.   
While the model legislation offered by ALEC may represent a noteworthy 
example of interest group lobbying, there is significant variety in how cities and 
states may approach the topic of municipal broadband, and the issue does not 
seem to be settled at this point in time. As such, municipal broadband programs 
and associated state legislation provide a useful test case to examine whether city 
leaders may become less responsive to local political interests following a threat of 
preemption. It is plausible to assert both that a community might desire this 
service, and that a state might preempt city authority on the issue. There are 
                                                     
4 It is important to make a note here about wireless access. Most home wireless access is based on 
wired access to the home, with a local point of access. Smartphone internet access is also 
noteworthy and increasingly important, but smartphone access outside of WiFi is typically 
associated with significant restrictions on monthly bandwidth that make home access a more 
feasible economic choice for many (The Executive Office of the President 2015). 
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practical and ideological concerns that frame these actions, but those concerns do 
not inspire the kind of backlash that more often accompany issues like fracking or 
LBGT protections.  Although the issue of municipal broadband will not be relevant 
in every city, town, and village, municipal broadband is an issue that is reasonably 
easy to explain and understand in the context of a survey, allowing this question to 
be tested. 
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Testing the Impact of Threat  
The chief theoretical assumption driving this project is that variation in the 
responses between test groups should reveal whether a threat of preemption on 
the state level would change the likely voting patterns of city leaders from a 
previous course. Assuming a random sample, the response from the control group 
should be representative of the response that each of the treatment groups would 
have had without exposure to the succeeding scenarios, allowing simple statistical 
tests to provide insight into whether the plans of city leaders are adversely affected 
by state behavior in this instance.  
To examine the dynamics discussed here and to test whether a given threat 
of state intervention affects the decision making of local officials, I have used a 
survey experiment, sampling city officials from across the United States. 
Invitations to the survey were sent by email to any municipal official that 
participated in the 2014 American Municipal Official Survey, so long as those email 
addresses did not return as invalid. 5 Email invitations were sent on Tuesday, 
February 28, 2017, and the survey closed on Tuesday, March 7, 2017. Respondents 
came from 49 of the 50 states, with responses occurring at largely similar rates to 
                                                     
5 Access to the mailing list came through the generosity of principal investigators Daniel Butler and 
Adam Dynes. Information about the survey, as well as its results may be found at 
http://campuspress.yale.edu/municipalsurvey/. 
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survey invitations. Further details on responses and geography may be found at 
the end of the appendix. 
The treatment was presented through a vignette, which asks the respondent 
to consider themselves serving in the role of a voting city council member.6 The 
vignettes gave three variations of stated preemption threat, ranging from no stated 
threat, to low and high degrees of perceived threat.  In both the control and two 
treatment groups, the vignette states that the city is considering establishing an 
ISP as a new municipal service through the city’s utility department, and describes 
the proposal in positive terms, with moderate majority support from local voters. 
It also states that the proposal is without any obviously troubling flaws in its 
feasibility, both financially and technically. After being presented with one of the 
three scenarios, respondents were asked for how they would vote in the given 
situation on a four-point scale, with no available neutral response. Respondents in 
the treatment groups that indicated support for the proposal were also asked 
whether they would choose to act quickly before the state legislature may have the 
opportunity to finish action. In addition to the treatment questions, respondents 
also answered questions about their political ideology on a single-dimensional left-
right scale, and about their representation style as either a delegate or trustee. The 
                                                     
6 Some respondents, such as certain mayors, may be elected officials that lack a voting role on a city 
council, while holding a different influential role in the legislative process for a city. The vignette 
asks respondents to consider themselves as voting members of the council in order to ensure that 
respondents view the questions in the same way.   
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full text for the survey, including the wording of the vignettes, can be found in the 
appendix. 
A threat of state preemption is one circumstance that would likely alter the 
level of political responsiveness displayed by city officials, because preemption 
may alter the incentives of pursuing particular policies and reduce the costs of 
failing to pursue those policies as well. This decision process may also make sense 
for the state. Although the state is clearly superior in law and capacity, conflicts 
between cities and states are not new, and it is reasonable to believe that state 
leaders, including the legislature and the governor, would prefer to have cities 
within the state acting according to the governor’s and legislator’s personal 
preference sets. States may be limited in how they can coerce cities to conform to 
preferred policy and institutional positions, and coercion through legislation, or 
even through the mere threat of legislation, could act to influence and manipulate 
cities into avoiding actions that officials at the state level would rather avoid. 
There has been significant variation in the success of these public 
broadband programs, along with some noteworthy failures. Invoking concerns of 
failure in the vignettes, however, would not serve to answer the central question 
about city-state interactions. This project aims to find whether the perceived 
threat of state intervention discourages policy that a city is likely to pursue. If the 
vignette described a clearly flawed proposal, a threat of state intervention would 
ͲͰ 
 
be only one of the reasons to vote against the proposal, rather than a determining 
reason for a dissenting vote. 
  
Ͳͱ 
 
Expectations and Hypotheses 
While it may be in the best interests of a municipality to pursue a given 
policy in a vacuum, the consequences of both preemption from the state or of 
challenging such preemption may be too great to be ignored, especially when the 
probability of reversing the state action is low. These factors, along with the 
previously discussed dynamics around preemption, lead to the following 
hypotheses on the relationship between state preemption and political 
responsiveness at the municipal level. 
Hypothesis 1: A perceived threat of state preemption will decrease the 
likelihood of city officials voting for the proposed service.  
Hypothesis 2: An increased degree of perceived threat of state preemption will 
result in a greater degree of opposition to the proposed service. 
 It is possible that a threat of preemption will not have a noteworthy impact 
on the behavior of city leaders. After all, the residents of a community, not state 
legislators, elect city leaders. If city residents were aware of threatened or executed 
preemption action from the state, they would likely direct their political 
frustrations toward the state, rather than toward their city and its leaders. 
Furthermore, hostile actions from a locally unpopular state legislature may provide 
city leaders with opportunities to cast themselves as better, more in-touch 
representatives of their constituents. If city leaders feel that their actions will have 
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the support of their constituents in opposition to state-level government, it would 
be in their electoral interests to dig in their heels on municipal goals, rather than 
simply acceding to the aims of a hostile state legislature. City leaders may attempt 
to call the bluff of the state government, as it is not uncommon for legislators to 
introduce bills and proposals that are doomed from conception. Furthermore, city 
leaders, who are themselves involved the legislative process, may very well realize 
when proposed preemption is an empty, rather than sincere threat. If city leaders 
perceive that they will not waste valuable city resources by pursuing actions that 
are unpopular with the state legislature, the likelihood that a threat of preemption 
would alter their behavior would decrease significantly, and the treatments used 
here would not have a significant effect. 
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Results  
Respondents were contacted by email, and from the contacted population, 
690 responses were recorded. The mailing list from the American Municipal 
Official Survey is now a few years old, and as a result, not every individual on the 
list is still currently serving in office. I also knew that the list contained a small 
number of non-elected municipal officials, including city clerks, managers, and 
other appointed officers. To account for the diversity of respondents in the mailing 
list, I asked a screening question at the beginning of the survey to determine 
whether respondents were currently serving elected officials, former elected 
officials, or if they had only served in non-elected positions.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Control and Treatment Groups 
 Current Elected Officials Only Current and Former Elected 
Officials 
Control Group 199 
 
215 
 
Treatment 
1—Moderate 
Threat 
186 
 
 
 
199 
 
Treatment 
2—High 
Threat 
184 
 
201 
 
Total 569 615 
In each table, values in cells refer to the frequency of each response. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Ideology and Representation Style 
 Current Elected Officials Only Current and Former Elected 
Officials 
Liberal 176 
31.32% 
193 
31.85% 
Middle of the 
Road 
128 
22.78% 
134 
22.11% 
Conservative 258 
45.9% 
279 
46.04% 
Total 562 606 
Delegate 178 
32% 
193 
32.11% 
Trustee 379 
68% 
408 
67.89% 
Total 557 601 
Note: Some respondents completed the treatments questions but declined to answer the 
ideology and/or representation style questions. Data indicates frequencies and column 
percentages. 
 
Of the sampled population, 569 respondents indicated that they were 
currently serving in elected office, while 46 respondents indicated that they have 
formerly served as elected officials. Finally, 75 respondents indicated that they 
have never served in elected office, but instead hold non-elected positions in their 
communities. Because they represent a uniquely different population within the 
sample, the responses of those who have never held public office have been 
omitted from the results presented here. Additionally, I present the results of 
currently serving officials and the combined group of officials that have ever 
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served in elected office separately, as there are differences in the day to day 
experiences of the two groups which might affect their responses. Tables 1 and 2 
detail the basic results of the survey. 
Chi-square tests show that the treatment effect has far from a statistically 
significant impact, whether examining current officials only, or examining both  
Table 3: Chi-Square Test for General Support of the Proposal 
 Level of 
Support 
Control Moderate 
Threat 
High Threat Total 
Current 
Elected 
Officials 
Only 
Strongly 
Support 
95 
47.74% 
83 
44.62% 
82 
44.57% 
260 
45.69% 
Moderately 
Support 
72 
36.18% 
70 
37.63% 
62 
33.7% 
204 
35.85% 
Moderately 
Oppose 
13 
6.53% 
21 
11.29% 
23 
12.5% 
57 
10.02% 
Strongly 
Oppose 
19 
9.55% 
12 
6.45% 
17 
9.24% 
48 
8.44% 
Total 199 186 184 569 
Current and 
Former 
Elected 
Officials 
Strongly 
Support 
104 
48.37% 
87 
43.72% 
87 
43.28% 
278 
45.2% 
Moderately 
Support 
76 
35.35% 
76 
38.19% 
70 
34.83% 
222 
36.1% 
Moderately 
Oppose 
14 
6.51% 
22 
11.06% 
25 
12.44% 
61 
9.92% 
Strongly 
Oppose 
21 
9.77% 
14 
7.04% 
19 
9.45% 
54 
8.78% 
Total 215 199 201 615 
For currently serving officials, χ2= 5.8352, p = 0.442. For Current and former elected officials, 
χ2= 6.1972, p= 0.401. 
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current and former elected officials. The chi-square test shown here applies to a 
crosstab table and evaluates whether attitudes toward the municipal broadband 
proposal are independent of group assignment. The effect was even weaker when 
checking for whether respondents simply supported or opposed the measure, and 
when checking solely for respondents that indicated strong support for the 
proposal. 
 
 
Table 4: Chi-Square Test for Broad Support of the Proposal 
 Voting 
Response to 
Proposal 
Control Moderate 
Threat 
High Threat Total 
Current 
Elected 
Officials 
Only 
Support 167 
83.92% 
153 
82.26% 
144 
78.26% 
464 
81.55% 
Oppose 32 
16.08% 
33 
17.74% 
40 
21.74% 
105 
18.45% 
Total 199 186 184 569 
Current 
and 
Former 
Elected 
Officials 
Support 
 
180 
83.72% 
163 
81.91% 
157 
78.11% 
500 
81.3% 
Oppose 
 
35 
16.28% 
36 
18.09% 
44 
21.89% 
115 
18.7% 
Total 215 199 201 615 
For currently serving officials, χ2= 2.2.1273, p = 0.345. For Current and former elected 
officials, χ2= 2.2234, p= 0.264. 
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Table 5: Chi-Square Test for Strong Support of the Proposal 
 Voting 
Response 
to Proposal 
Control Moderate 
Threat 
High Threat Total 
Current 
Elected 
Officials Only 
 
Strong 
Support 
95 
47.74% 
83 
44.62% 
82 
44.57% 
260 
45.69% 
 
Other 
Responses 
104 
52.26% 
103 
55.38% 
102 
55.43% 
309 
54.31% 
 
Total 
199 186 184 569 
Current and 
Former 
Elected 
Officials 
Strongly 
support 
 
104 
48.37% 
87 
43.72% 
87 
43.28% 
278 
45.2% 
Other 
Responses 
 
111 
51.63% 
112 
56.28% 
114 
56.72% 
337 
54.8% 
 
Total 215 199 201 615 
For currently serving officials, χ2= 0.5156, p = 0.773. For Current and former elected officials, 
χ2= 1.3477, p= 0.510. 
  
The difference of proportions test is a parametric test for two categories 
that has greater statistical power than the chi-square test. The difference of 
proportions tests shown here also demonstrate that the treatment did not generate 
a statistically significant effect on responses to the municipal broadband proposal, 
even when using a generous one-tailed test.  The lack of a significant relationship 
between the treatment assignment and the respondent’s attitude toward 
municipal broadband is consistent when examining either the responses of only 
currently serving elected officials, or both current and former elected officials.  
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Table 6: Difference of Proportions Test for Support of the Proposal 
 Current Elected Officials Only Current and Former Elected Officials 
 Diff.  
p1 – p2 
Std. Err. p n Diff.  
p1 – p2 
Std. Err. p n 
Control 
vs. 
Moderate 
Threat 
 
 
0.017 
 
0.038 
 
0.331 
 
385 
 
0.018 
 
0.037 
 
0.313 
 
414 
Control 
vs. High 
Threat 
 
 
0.057 
 
0.040 
 
0.078 
 
383 
 
0.056 
 
0.039 
 
0.072 
 
416 
Moderate 
Threat vs. 
High 
Threat 
 
0.040 
 
0.041 
 
0.167 
 
370 
 
0.380 
 
0.040 
 
0.171 
 
400 
Diff. is the difference of proportions, with standard errors beside it. p represents the one-tailed 
p value. The one-tailed test increases the chance of finding a significant relationship between 
the treatment and responses, but such a relationship is still found to not be significant. 
 
However, the figures produced by this test are certainly more compelling than the 
figures produced by the chi-square model are.  
Finally, both ordered and binary probit regression models run on both 
sample groups show that the treatment in this experiment did not lead to a 
statistically significant change in the likelihood that municipal leaders would vote 
in favor of the given proposal. These tests are a full modeling approach that allow 
for paired comparisons of different treatments as an omnibus test of the effects of 
the test treatments against the control condition. The ordered probit model 
examines all available information by incorporating all four available responses  
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Table 7: Ordered Probit Test for Support of the Proposal 
 Current Elected Officials 
Only 
Current and Former Elected 
Officials 
Moderate Threat .0364208 
.1143098 
.0650715 
.1102291 
High Threat .099558 
.1145203 
.1281586 
.1098163 
Pseudo-R2 0.0006 0.0009 
Likelihood Ratio χ2 
P 
0.77 
.680 
1.36 
.506 
n= 569 for current elected officials only and 615 for current and former elected 
officials. Standard Errors in italics. 
 
 
Table 8: Probit Test for Support of the Proposal 
 Current Elected Officials 
Only 
Current and Former Elected 
Officials 
Moderate Threat -.0659142 
.1516067 
-.0711295 
.1456557 
High Threat -.210125 
.1485672 
-.2071578 
.1422243 
Constant .9911588 
.1066763 
.9830529 
.102318 
Pseudo-R2 0.0006 0.0009 
Likelihood Ratio χ2 
P 
2.10 
.350 
2.20 
.333 
n= 569 for current elected officials only and 615 for current and former elected 
officials. Standard Errors in italics. 
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regarding the broadband proposal, while the probit model instead evaluates 
differences between support and opposition as a binary variable.  
It may be possible that the non-significant results found here might be a 
result of an insufficient sample size. A power analysis for a difference of 
proportions test shows that if the sample in each treatment were increased to 231, 
the project would be powered to have an 80% chance of detecting a change in the 
predicted probability of 0.1 using a one tailed test with α=0.05. If a significant 
relationship between the given threat of preemption and support for the described 
service proposal exists at all, the effect is very likely smaller than that ten-point 
difference, as this investigation showed a maximum difference of 0.057. 
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Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
 While the survey responses showed that city leaders are generally unswayed 
by threatened state actions, there are some heterogeneous treatment effects. These 
effects are likely the result of the construction of the vignettes. In describing the 
threatened state action, the treatment vignettes state that “some state legislators 
do not think such a plan is within the proper role of city government” (see 
appendix). This phrasing may activate certain perceptions and attitudes in 
moderate and conservative city leaders and lead them to be more sensitive to the 
treatments than they would otherwise be.  
Table 9: Difference of Proportions for Liberals 
Officials who Identified as Liberal 
 Diff. 
p1 – p2 
Std. Error p n 
Control vs. 
Moderate 
Threat 
 
-0.054 
 
0.038 
 
0.924 
 
117 
Control Vs. 
High 
Threat 
 
-0.016 
 
0.043 
 
0.649 
 
131 
Moderate 
Threat vs. 
High 
Threat 
 
0.037 
 
0.031 
 
0.128 
 
134 
Diff. is the difference of proportions, with standard errors beside it. p represents the one-tailed 
p value. The one-tailed test increases the chance of finding a significant relationship between 
the treatment and responses, but such a relationship is still found to not be significant. 
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Table 10: Difference of Proportions for Moderates and Conservatives 
 Officials who Identified as  
“Middle of the Road” 
Officials who Identified as 
Conservative 
 Diff. 
p1 – p2 
Std. 
Error 
p n Diff. 
p1 – p2 
Std. 
Error 
p n 
Control 
vs. 
Moderate 
Threat 
 
0.051 
 
0.076 
 
0.245 
 
88 
 
0.046 
 
0.061 
 
0.225 
 
209 
Control 
Vs. High 
Threat 
 
0.129 
 
0.078 
 
 
0.048 
 
97 
 
0.118 
 
0.067 
 
0.038 
 
188 
Moderate 
Threat vs. 
High 
Threat 
 
 
0.078 
 
 
0.089 
 
 
 
0.196 
 
 
81 
 
 
0.072 
 
 
0.069 
 
 
0.147 
 
 
185 
Diff. is the difference of proportions, with standard errors beside it. p represents the one-tailed 
p value. The one-tailed test was used as it increases the chance of finding a significant 
relationship between the treatment and responses. In this instance, both groups show a 
significant relationship between the high threat treatment and associated responses when 
compared to the control group, but no other comparison produced this result. 
 
Table nine shows the results of the difference of proportions test for 
respondents who self-identified as liberals. Liberals were resistant to the treatment 
effects, and it appears that a perceived threat of state preemption in this instance 
had essentially zero effect on their voting decisions. Table 10 displays the results of 
a difference of proportions test for respondents that self-identified as conservatives 
and moderates (identified as “middle of the road” in the survey prompt). The 
results of this test show that the high threat treatment swayed the responses of 
moderates and conservatives by about 12-13 points, and the results are significant 
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in a one tailed test with α=0.05. Substantively, however, these results are less 
remarkable. For conservatives, the effect dropped support for the proposal from 
76.4% of respondents to 64.6%, and for moderates, support for the proposal 
dropped from 88.4% to 75.5%. In each case, the proposal would have passed easily. 
An effect of this size is far less detrimental to this proposal than it might be if the 
proposal was controversial at the local level or had only borderline support from a 
city council. 
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Discussion 
From the results of this survey, it is clear that the treatments used did not 
have a noteworthy effect on the how city leaders indicated that they would vote, 
and it appears that a threat of preemption alone is not sufficient to alter the votes 
of city leaders. Even in the narrow circumstances where the treatment had a 
statistically significant effect on support for the proposal, that effect was not 
substantively significant, and would only scuttle proposals with borderline 
support.  
There are a few explanations for why this might be the case. First, it is not 
necessarily in the interest of city leaders to be swayed by the state legislature, as 
state legislatures do not vote for city leaders. From a normative perspective, this is 
reassuring, as it would lead us to believe that electoral incentives are at play in the 
decision making of local officials and that those officials strive to represent the 
interests of their communities. The interests of other communities in the state, 
and of the representatives in the state legislature are not the concern of local 
officials, except as those independent concerns intersect. This is an intuitive, but 
important conclusion for explaining the voting incentives at play in this 
experiment. This explanation also provides a way to view the results as fitting 
within the broader literature on representation and responsiveness, as outlined by 
Tiebout, Warshaw, Tausanovitch, Hirschman and others.  
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Second, city leaders may not be afraid of preemption itself, and may wish to 
react only after the state legislature has acted. Even if some city leaders do not 
think the proposal is good policy, they may determine that it is more important for 
them to act according to their constituent’s desires than it is to save time and 
money for the city government. In this scenario, city leaders can blame a state 
legislature for the restrictions and consequences of preemption, and reduce their 
own electoral risk as a result. Weaver notes that the motivation behind blame-
avoidance is simple, as city leaders “cannot pursue their other policy objectives if 
they are not re-elected, and they will not be re-elected if they do not suppress their 
own views of “good policy” when those views clash with the strongly held opinions 
of their constituents” (Weaver 2009). Although the survey vignettes did not 
describe a desire for a municipal broadband network as a strongly held opinion for 
voters in the city, the vignettes did indicate majority support, and the incentives 
involved in blame-avoidance may be at play here. 
Finally, the survey itself may have presented a case where a threat of 
preemption was less intimidating than it needed to be to inspire a change in vote 
patterns. The way that questions are framed can alter how individuals perceive 
their choices, and it is possible that a more stark threat of preemption could have 
had a greater discouraging effect on the proportion of respondents that indicated 
support for the proposal. This effect may be seen in the responses of conservative 
and moderate respondents that received the high threat treatment, but that effect 
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was limited and was not significant across the general sample. While the effect 
that question framing has is important, I do not believe that the failure of the 
treatments to produce significant results can be traced to the framing of the 
preemption threat, as one of the treatments was specifically designed to describe a 
high threat of preemption from the state. It is also important that the scenarios 
described appear to be somewhat realistic to the respondent, and increasing the 
given threat to a point where it inspired significant results might require 
describing a situation that currently serving city officials would simply find 
unrealistic. Alternatively, an overstated threat of preemption might not be 
something that respondents perceive as a realistic threat for their cities. It is not 
entirely uncommon for state legislators to introduce legislation that is unlikely to 
pass, and city leaders may be willing to call the bluff of their state representatives. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In some ways, the subject of municipal broadband offers a fairly narrow 
perspective on city services, and perceptions of the issue may occasionally be 
colored by outside variables that are difficult to measure. However, municipal 
broadband also provides a useful and distinctive lens through which to examine 
some of the relationship dynamics of intra-state federalism. Although the state is 
clearly superior in law and capacity, city leaders have few electoral incentives and 
little reason to do what state leaders might hope. Conflicts between cities and 
states are not new and do not appear to be going away.  
It seems logical that states will act to influence and manipulate cities into 
avoiding undesirable policy positions, but we are left without evidence that 
manipulation in the form of a threat will be effective. Of course, states can still 
exercise preemptive authority over cities as a blunt instrument of policy, and many 
state legislatures will likely be willing to exercise this authority. At times, this may 
be a drastic step, and for a state legislature looking to avoid a showdown, there 
does not appear to be a middle-ground solution.  
The independent electoral incentives of city and state leaders may doom 
them to conflict in certain cases, but in other situations, these separate incentives 
may allow city and state leaders to satisfy their own constituencies more 
effectively, allowing for a diversity of local political outcomes. Residents of such 
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states may be better able to vote with their feet without moving out of state 
altogether or drastically uprooting their lives, and potential new residents may 
have an easier time finding a community to settle in. Whether these 
considerations would be compelling to leaders at the state level is unclear, but 
such a question would be a good place for future research into the dynamics of 
intra-state federalism. 
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APPENDIX – SURVEY CONTENT AND DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS 
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Survey Content 
For full transparency, the complete wording of the questions used for this 
project’s survey experiment are presented here. The survey posed some additional 
questions for respondents beyond what was briefly described in the methodology 
section. First, respondents were asked to indicate their political ideology on a 
seven-point left-right ideological scale. Additionally, respondents were asked 
about how they viewed their role as a legislator, with the aim of classifying 
respondents as delegates or trustees. Variable names are indicated with each 
question. The full content of the survey follows. 
Variable Name: Elected Status 
Question: Have you served as an elected municipal official? 
Response Options: 
1. I am currently serving as an elected municipal official.  
2. I have formerly served as an elected municipal official.  
3. I have never served as an elected municipal official.  
 
Introductory Statement: Please consider the following scenario and questions as if 
they applied to your city and you have a vote on the council. 
Variable Name: Control 
Prompt and Question: 
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Among the new policy proposals within your community is a plan for the city’s 
utility department to create a fiber-optic internet network. This network would 
offer broadband internet access as an additional utility to customers that choose to 
participate. It appears that the proposal is supported by about 55% to 60% of the 
population, and is not likely to present you with great political risk.  
It appears that the plan is financially reasonable; furthermore, the principal 
financing for the project should be manageable. In addition, the proposal has been 
designed to minimize the financial costs of network creation by spreading the 
project over years and implementing the new infrastructure as existing electric and 
other utility lines are maintained. Fiber-optic cable will be used alongside current 
utility infrastructure and will be put in place whenever any other form of work 
needs to be done within the grid. With the decision to minimize the instances in 
which underground lines need to be accessed, it is likely that costs will remain 
modest.  
Based on this information, would you say that you support or oppose the current 
proposal? 
Response Options: 
1. Strongly support  
2. Somewhat support  
3. Somewhat oppose  
4. Strongly oppose  
Variable Name: Moderate Threat 
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Prompt and Question: 
Among the new policy proposals within your community is a plan for the city’s 
utility department to create a fiber-optic internet network. This network would 
offer broadband internet access as an additional utility to customers that choose to 
participate. It appears that the proposal is supported by about 60% of the 
population, and is not likely to present you with great political risk.  
It appears that the plan is financially reasonable; furthermore, the principal 
financing for the project should be manageable. In addition, the proposal has been 
designed to minimize the financial costs of network creation by spreading the 
project over years and implementing the new infrastructure as existing electric and 
other utility lines are maintained. Fiber-optic cable will be used alongside current 
utility infrastructure and will be put in place whenever any other form of work 
needs to be done within the grid. With the decision to minimize the instances in 
which underground lines need to be accessed, it is likely that costs will remain 
modest. 
There is a possibility that the state government may interfere with such a plan. 
You have heard rumors that some state legislators do not think such a plan is 
within the proper role of city government and may introduce legislation that 
would limit your city’s ability to create and run a network such as this. If such 
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legislation were to pass, it could undo some or all of the work your city does on 
this issue.  
Based on this information, do you support the current proposal?  
Response Options: 
1. Strongly support  
2. Somewhat support  
3. Somewhat oppose  
4. Strongly oppose  
 
Variable Name: High Threat 
Prompt and Question: 
Among the new policy proposals within your community is a plan for the city’s 
utility department to create a fiber-optic internet network. This network would 
offer broadband internet access as an additional utility to customers that choose to 
participate. It appears that the proposal is supported by about 60% of the 
population, and is not likely to present you with great political risk.  
It appears that the plan is financially reasonable; furthermore, the principal 
financing for the project should be manageable. In addition, the proposal has been 
designed to minimize the financial costs of network creation by spreading the 
project over years and implementing the new infrastructure as existing electric and 
other utility lines are maintained. Fiber-optic cable will be used alongside current 
utility infrastructure and will be put in place whenever any other form of work 
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needs to be done within the grid. With the decision to minimize the instances in 
which underground lines need to be accessed, it is likely that costs will remain 
modest.  
There is a possibility that the state government may interfere with such a plan. 
You have heard rumors that some state legislators do not think such a plan is 
within the proper role of city government and may introduce legislation that 
would limit your city’s ability to create and run a network such as this. Major 
lobbying groups and corporations, including the American Legislative Exchange 
Council and the major telephone, cable, and communications companies of your 
state appear to support the legislature’s desire to block cities from running their 
own broadband internet services. If legislation like this were to pass, it could undo 
some or all of the work your city does on this issue. 
Based on this information, do you support the current proposal? 
Response Options: 
1. Strongly support  
2. Somewhat support  
3. Somewhat oppose  
4. Strongly oppose  
Variable Name: Act Quickly 
Presented to respondents in either of the treatment groups: 
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Question: If you do support, would you attempt to act quickly before the state 
legislature can take action? 
Response Options: 
1. Yes  
2. No  
 
Variable Name: Representation Style: 
Question: Do you consider your role as a city leader to provide effective leadership 
based on your experience, judgment, and capability? Or, do you consider your 
primary role as a city leader to represent the will of the residents of your city 
independent of your own personal judgment? 
1. Leadership based on judgment 
2. Leadership based on representation 
 
Variable Name: Ideology  
Question: Do you consider yourself to be:  
Response Options: 
1. Very Liberal 
2. Liberal 
3. Somewhat Liberal 
4. Middle of the Road 
5. Somewhat Conservative 
6. Conservative 
7. Very Conservative 
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Geographic Distribution of Responses 
 The geographic distribution of individual survey responses has also been 
included here. The following tables describe the frequency of responses from each 
state and what proportion of responses they represent, as well as the frequency of 
mailing addresses from each state and the proportion of the mailing list they each 
state’s list represents.  
Table 11: Survey Responses by State 
State Frequency Percentage 
Alabama 7 1.05 
Alaska 4 1.66 
Arizona 15 2.26 
Arkansas 9 1.36 
California 52 7.83 
Colorado 23 3.46 
Connecticut 11 1.66 
Delaware 4 0.60 
Florida 22 3.31 
Georgia 9 1.36 
Idaho 10 1.51 
Illinois 42 6.33 
Indiana 9 1.36 
Iowa 10 1.51 
Kansas 7 1.05 
Kentucky 3 0.45 
Louisiana 1 0.15 
Maine 7 1.05 
Maryland 10 1.51 
Massachusetts 15 2.26 
Michigan 34 5.12 
Minnesota 33 4.97 
Mississippi 2 0.30 
Missouri 9 1.36 
Montana 1 0.15 
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Table 12: Survey Mailing Distribution by State 
State Frequency Percentage 
Alabama 552 1.55 
Alaska 135 0.38 
Arizona 506 1.42 
Arkansas 453 1.27 
California 2483 6.97 
Colorado 821 2.31 
Connecticut 686 1.93 
Delaware 133 0.37 
District of 
Columbia 
10 0.03 
Florida 1344 3.77 
Table Continues 
Nebraska 2 0.30 
Nevada 1 0.15 
New Hampshire 4 0.60 
New Jersey 19 2.86 
New Mexico 4 0.60 
New York 37 5.57 
North Carolina 16 2.41 
North Dakota 1 0.15 
Ohio 21 3.16 
Oklahoma 6 0.90 
Oregon 18 2.71 
Pennsylvania 22 3.31 
Rhode Island 2 0.30 
South Carolina 7 1.05 
South Dakota 4 0.60 
Tennessee 9 1.36 
Texas 28 4.22 
Utah 28 4.22 
Vermont 8 1.20 
Virginia 14 2.11 
Washington 22 3.31 
West Virginia 6 0.90 
Wisconsin 32 4.82 
Wyoming 4 0.60 
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Table Continues 
Georgia 838 2.35 
Hawaii 11 0.03 
Idaho 191 0.54 
Illinois 2253 6.33 
Indiana 752 2.11 
Iowa 597 1.68 
Kansas 405 1.14 
Kentucky 495 1.39 
Louisiana 222 0.62 
Maine 441 1.24 
Maryland 319 0.90 
Massachusetts 962 2.70 
Michigan 1673 4.70 
Minnesota 1349 3.79 
Mississippi 264 0.74 
Missouri 977 2.74 
Montana 91 0.26 
Nebraska 183 0.51 
Nevada 49 0.14 
New Hampshire 270 0.76 
New Jersey 1649 4.63 
New Mexico 251 0.70 
New York 1991 5.59 
North Carolina 1032 2.90 
North Dakota 115 0.32 
Ohio 1737 4.88 
Oklahoma 300 0.84 
Oregon 587 1.65 
Pennsylvania 1395 3.92 
Rhode Island 196 0.55 
South Carolina 387 1.09 
South Dakota 129 0.36 
Tennessee 535 1.50 
Texas 1933 5.43 
Utah 436 1.22 
Vermont 208 0.25 
Virginia 483 1.36 
Washington 784 2.20 
West Virginia 200 0.56 
Wisconsin 1672 4.70 
Wyoming 120 0.34 
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